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1. Introduction
Modern control technology allows system analysis and
control through a variety of techniques in time and fre-
quency domains. Decision making in predefined situ-
ations has also been implemented using expert systems
and rule-based control systems. For example, in [1], a
fault monitoring and diagnosis expert system is de-
scribed to assist pilots in handling in-flight faults. In
[2], an expert system is described for control system
design that would be a useful tool to handle sudden
structural changes. These so-called intelligent fault-
monitoring systems operate as qualitative systems, i.e.,
they reason by use of a symbolic knowledge represen-
tation. Fault monitoring systems must interact with
the real physical world that operates on quantitative,
i.e., continuous-time, sensory and actuator signals. To
this end, sensory information obtained from the plant
to be monitored needs to be discretised before it can
be used by the reasoning system, and often, the dis-
crete decisions reached by the intelligent system needs
to be translated back to smooth real-valued control
decisions.
When modelling a system, it is possible to use a
mixed quantitative/qualitative knowledge represen-
tation [3] that may combine the advantages of both
types of approaches and may help solve problems
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that neither a purely quantitative nor a strictly quali-
tative model may be able to solve on its own. Modern
approaches to fault diagnosis include the so-called
model-based approach [4]. This kind of fault detection
approach makes explicit use of a quantitative math-
ematical model of the system. The implementation of
on-board digital computers allows the development
of fault detection, fault isolation, and fault identifica-
tion exploiting the use of analytical rather than hard-
ware redundancy.
One of the objectives of this research is to combine
the quantitative simulation of a continuous process
with a qualitative simulation technique to perform
fault detection; fault isolation and fault identification
are beyond the scope of this paper. In this article, a
new methodological aspect in the mark of the Fuzzy
Inductive Reasoning methodology is applied to improve
fault detection in large-scale systems. An example al-
ready employed in previous publications [5–10], namely
the numerical model of a B747 aircraft, is used to com-
pare the obtained results.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In order
for the work to be self-contained, Section 2 summarises
the FIR methodology except for the qualitative simula-
tion engine that, for convenience, shall be explained in
Section 5. Section 3 provides a short summary of pre-
vious research efforts [5] and [9], and then briefly ex-
plains the quantitative model of the aircraft as well as
the qualitative models obtained with FIR. In Section 4,
a modified experiment using the same aircraft model
is proposed, and then, in Section 4.1, the technique
used in [5] and [9] to perform fault detection is applied
to the new data for the purpose of comparing its results
with the newly presented approach. In Section 5, a
new concept in the FIR methodology context is intro-
duced, firstly presented in [10], and applied to the de-
tection of faults in the modified example. Section 6 is
left for the conclusions.
2. Fuzzy Inductive Reasoning Methodology
Inductive reasoning (IR) is an inductive modelling tech-
nique designed by Klir [11] as part of his General Sys-
tem Problem Solving (GSPS) framework. IR was first
implemented by Uyttenhove [12] during his PhD dis-
sertation research. This implementation was called
Systems Approach Problem Solver (SAPS). An improved
version of the original SAPS program was developed
by Cellier and Yandell [13] and later extended by Li
and Cellier [14] to offer fuzzy reasoning capabilities.
Accordingly, the enhanced methodology is now called
Fuzzy Inductive Reasoning [15].
In the sequel, a number of different authors used
FIR to qualitatively model and simulate different kinds
of systems and time series, while constantly improving
the methodology [7, 16, 17, 18]. Concretely in [17], FIR
is successfully applied to the problem of modelling and
simulating univariate time-series, and in [18, 19], a re-
search effort made at the University of Ghent, Belgium,
the FIR methodology is complemented using tree clas-
sification procedures.
FIR offers four main modules and many auxiliary
routines. Two of the main modules are computational
engines, a qualitative modelling engine, and a qualitative
simulation engine; the other two are data filters, a fuzzi-
fication module, and a defuzzification module. FIR operates
on observations of input/output behaviour of multi-
input, single-output (MISO) systems, and consequently,
a multi-input, multi-output system has to be modelled
by several parallel FIR models, one for each output.
The Fuzzification Module
It is the task of this module to convert quantitative
data gathered from the system to its qualitative coun-
terpart. In FIR, the process of fuzzification is called
recoding. In this process, each quantitative data point
is mapped into a qualitative triple, containing class,
fuzzy membership, and side values. Data are usually
recoded into an odd number of classes using equal fre-
quency partitioning to determine the landmarks be-
tween neighbouring classes. The fuzzy membership
function is a bell-shaped Gaussian curve, which as-
sumes a maximum value of 1.0 at the centre between
two landmarks, and a value of 0.5 at each of them.
The side value describes whether the real data point
lies to the left (side = –1), at the centre (side = 0), or to
the right (side = 1) of the maximum of the membership
function governing the chosen class. The complete
operation of this module has been described in [20].
The Qualitative Modelling Engine
The goal of the Qualitative Modelling Engine (QME)
is to determine the best behaviour system from a given
data system and a predetermined output variable. The
data system is initially provided to FIR in the form of
a real-valued matrix. This raw data matrix may take
the form:
where δt is the sampling rate. Each row represents one
complete observation record, and each column repre-
sents one observed variable. In the above example, the
data system contains nrec data points for each of the
four input variables, u1 ... u4 , and the single output
variable y1 .
The raw data matrix is then converted, by means of
the recoding process, into three matrices of equal di-
mensions: a qualitative class value matrix, a real-valued
fuzzy membership matrix with elements in the range
[0.5, 1.0], and a ternary side value matrix with elements
in the set {–1, 0, +1}. With the recoded data, the QME
tries to find relationships among the class values that
are as deterministic as possible, trying to discover be-
havioural patterns among the observations using the
information stored in the class value matrix. In the case
of the above four-input, single-output systems, a pos-
sible qualitative relationship that allows the model-
ling of the output variable from past values of itself as
well as current and past values of the inputs, could be:
y1(t) = ƒ(u3(t – 2δ t), (u1(t – δ t),
(u4(t – δ t), y1(t – δ t), u1(t))
where f  is a qualitative tabular function specified by
means of the training data.
The QME returns such a qualitative relationship
encoded in the form of another matrix called a mask in
the context of FIR. Masks have the same number of
columns as the data system to which they belong, and
a certain number of rows, called the depth of the mask.
Negative elements represent inputs of the qualitative
relationship (so-called m-inputs), whereas the single
positive element represents the mask output (the so-
called m-output). The number of non-zero elements is
the so-called mask complexity. The mask corresponding
to the previously introduced qualitative relationship
is shown below.
In the QME, a search of the optimal (the most deter-
ministic, based on Shannon entropy) qualitative rela-
tionship (qualitative model) is performed by either an
exhaustive search or one of several heuristics applied
to a set of mask candidates. The set of mask candidates
is encoded in the form of a so-called candidate mask
that contains –1 elements at the locations of potential
m-inputs, and a +1 at the location of the m-output. If the
modeller wants to forbid a relation, a 0 element should
be introduced in the given position. A possible candi-
date mask for the five-variable system is shown below.
A detailed description of how the quality of each
mask is computed is given in [20]. The optimal mask
offers a good compromise between a complexity and an
uncertainty reduction measure. It chooses those inputs,
at given delays, that best model the observed output.
Once the optimal mask has been found, it can be used
to flatten dynamic relations into static ones. The mask
can be shifted over the matrices that represent the re-
coded data system; in each mask position, the selected
m-inputs and m-output can be extracted from the data
system, and can be written next to each other in a static
record. At this point every row of the obtained matrix
represent a fuzzy rule. Static records can then be sorted
alphabetically. Figure 1 illustrates this process.
This operation is done with the three recoded matri-
ces: the class, membership and side matrices, separately.
Consequently, three behaviour matrices are obtained.
Together, the three behaviour matrices constitute a set
of fuzzy rules that FIR automatically synthesises from
the training data and the optimal mask. These behav-
iour matrices as well as the optimal mask are used in
the qualitative simulation engine.
The Qualitative Simulation Engine
For convenience, the description of this module is
Figure 1.  Obtaining static relations by use of a mask
left for Section 5, so the new theoretic approach, the
envelopes, can be fully understood.
The Defuzzification Module
It performs the reverse operation of the fuzzification
module, converting qualitative triples back to real-val-
ued data. The side value makes it possible to perform
the defuzzification of the qualitative into quantitative
values unambiguously and without information loss.
3. Previous Research and the Aircraft Model
In a previous research effort at the University of Ari-
zona, qualitative simulation was applied to reason
inductively about the behaviour of a quantitatively
simulated B-747 aircraft model, to determine online
when a malfunction occurs in the quantitative model.
A crisp inductive reasoner (using a qualitative model
computed only on the basis of class values, i.e., with-
out membership and/or side information) was used
to recognise that the aircraft had qualitatively changed
its behaviour within a few seconds after a simulated
malfunction had taken place. Crisp inductive reasoning
and crisp detection were used to perform fault detec-
tion. The results of this study were reported in [5, 6].
Later on, continuing with the research in this area
at the Polytechnic University of Catalonia, the former
crisp inductive reasoner was replaced by a fuzzy in-
ductive reasoner. This modified reasoning scheme had
an enhanced discriminatory power and an improved
forecasting capability. The new fuzzy inductive reasoner
allows the prediction of a real-valued variable, whereas
the crisp inductive reasoner was able to predict class
values only. In this research effort, fuzzy inductive
reasoning (FIR) and crisp detection (only using infor-
mation given by the class values) were used to perform
fault detection. The results of this study were reported
in [7, 8, 9].
An improved method based on fuzzy inductive
reasoning is presented in this paper with the aim of
fault detection. Fuzzy inductive reasoning and what
is now called envelope detection, to be explained in
Section 5, are used here. As will be shown, using en-
velopes improves the fault detection approach, allow-
ing the detection of faults at an earlier stage, and even
the detection of faults that are not detected using either
of the previous two approaches.
A numerical model of the B-747 aircraft has been
used to generate episodes of the five variables shown
in Figure 2. Two input variables, the variation in the
elevator deflexion ∆δtrim and the variation in the thrust
∆Ttrim , and three output variables, the lift L, drag D,
and the flight path angle GA, are considered. The
mathematical model used is exactly the same that was
reported in [5, 6]. This model, named B4, is valid for a
B-747 at high altitude horizontal flight.
The mathematical model described in the given ref-
erences reflects an essentially longitudinal flight re-
stricted to longitudinal deviations from a trimmed
reference flight condition. The main characteristic of
this reference flight is the requirement that the result-
ant force and moment acting on the aircraft’s centre of
mass are zero.
The original aerodynamic parameters of this model
were modified to artificially generate faults to test the
fault detection methodology (the generated faults do
not necessary correspond to real fault situations). Hence
different models are found that represent structural
changes of the original plane. The main characteristics
of these models are [5, 6]:
• Model B4 is the original model representing a B-747
in cruise flight at 20.000 feet altitude. Its aerody-
namic parameters are used as reference for the other
models.
• Model B13 is characterised by a much more damped
step response to the same step inputs. The effect of
the angle of attack on the lift coefficient L has been
slightly increased. A significant change in the effect
of the angle of attack on the drag coefficient D oc-
curred. The effect of the elevator deflection, ∆δtrim ,
on the pitching moment has also changed.
• Model B5 represents a change of the original B4
model, which completely alters the influence that
the angle of attack has on the aerodynamic response
of the aircraft.
Figure 2.  Input and output variables of the aircraft model
• Model 747 represents an enlarged B-747 in cruise
flight. In this case, the values of the lift L, aerody-
namic momentum, drag D, and the pitch angle are
changed.
In this paper, only two among the aforementioned
aircraft models are being used, namely the B4 model,
corresponding to the aircraft under normal operation,
and the B13 model, representing a fault. Other mal-
function situations described in the referenced litera-
ture [5] can be tackled in the same way.
The simulation of the quantitative model is per-
formed using ACSL (Advanced Continuous Simulation
Language, [21]). Once the quantitative model has been
implemented in ACSL, trajectories for the five named
variables are generated. The qualitative modelling
technique described in Section 2, FIR, is then applied,
and a qualitative model of the aircraft is obtained. De-
tails about the process of obtaining the qualitative air-
craft model can be found in [10]. As FIR works with
MISO systems only, it is necessary to find one model
for every output. After performing the optimal mask
search (using an exhaustive search), the following
masks are found:
These three masks, together with the behaviour ma-
trices and the fuzzification landmarks, constitute the
qualitative model of the B4 aircraft. This model was
obtained using SAPS in its present Matlab toolbox ver-
sion.
Now, with the qualitative model, it is possible to
compare trajectories from variables of the real system
(ACSL simulation) with forecast episodes from the
qualitative model. When a structural change has taken
place, the model can no longer predict the system. It is
at this point that fault detection is achieved. Results
obtained with the new methodology are to be compared
with those obtained in the previous publications.
4. Smooth Change in the Aircraft Parameters
In order to generate trajectories with accidents, the
flight starts with the B4 model (normal situation), and
at a given time, a malfunction is numerically simulated
by changing some of the structural parameters of the
aircraft. In the previous research studies [6, 9], the
change of parameters occurs suddenly, i.e., a step per-
turbation is performed so the change on the parameters
of the aircraft is immediate. Such a sudden change is
relatively easy to detect as it results in a violent tran-
sient behaviour of the aircraft, whereby the qualitative
classes of the considered outputs change, making it
possible to detect the fault by looking at the class val-
ues only. Precisely this technique, looking for discrep-
ancies between the observed and the predicted class
values of the output variable, has been employed to
perform fault detection in the aircraft model in [6] and
[9]. Although the former technique used a crisp induc-
tive reasoner, whereas the latter used an improved
fuzzy inductive reasoner, the fault was, in both cases,
detected using information about the class values only.
The performed instantaneous parameter change im-
plies a sharp transient in the variables taken into ac-
count. This transient was used to detect the aeroplane
malfunction, so in some way, the methodology did
Figure 3.  Drag (D): trajectory with
a sudden change in the parameters
Figure 4.  Drag (D): trajectory with
a smooth change in the parameter
not really detect the model change, but rather the highly
dramatic transition phase between the two models.
For instance, Figure 3 shows the transient in the out-
put variable D resulting from an abrupt B4-B13 model
transition.
Although some real malfunctions may indeed in-
volve a sudden change in the parameters, quite often
this is not the case, and it may therefore be more real-
istic to consider gradual rather than sudden changes.
To model this situation, a smooth change in the aero-
plane parameters has been simulated. The total range
of parameter changes is the same as used previously,
but now the parameters change gradually by ramping
them from their initial to their final values over a pe-
riod of 10 seconds. Figure 4 shows the change in the
output variable D when the parameter values change
smoothly.
4.1 Crisp Detection Using Smoothed Data
In order to compare the effectiveness of the new fault
detection scheme, based on the so-called envelopes,
with previous results, in this section the fault detection
method presented in [6] and [9] is summarised and
applied to the smooth parameter change explained in
the previous section.
By using the numerical ACSL aircraft model, quan-
titative data representing the real system in a fault situ-
ation are gathered. The considered fault is the one
named B13 in Section 3. The real-valued data obtained
by means of a quantitative (ACSL) fault simulation is
then converted to qualitative triplets of class, member-
ship, and side values using the fuzzification module
of FIR. Afterwards, the qualitative model previously
obtained from the normal aircraft operation data (re-
ported in Section 3) is used to predict the future behav-
iour of the aeroplane using the new situation fault
data. Therefore, for each new data point coming from
the real system (in the given experiment, the ACSL
simulation), a prediction of the considered output
variables is computed. The idea behind this is that
when a structural change occurs, the qualitative model
will receive inputs that have never been seen before.
Hence it will no longer be able to correctly predict the
behaviour of the system, thereby triggering an alarm
vector indicating that a system fault has occurred.
At each sampling interval, an instantaneous error
for each system output is computed by subtracting the
real-system (fuzzified) class values and the predicted
class values using the qualitative model. As long as the
prediction is correct, the subtraction results in a value
of zero. Hence values different from zero indicate a
false prediction that may be interpreted as a potential
indicator of a fault having occurred. These errors are
stored in a matrix. Then, a moving average error filter
is shifted down this matrix, computing, for each out-
put, the sum of instantaneous errors it covers. These
cumulative errors are in turn stored in another matrix.
If any of these values, at a given point of time, passes
the threshold (m) of the alarm module, an alarm is im-
mediately triggered, i.e., a fault has been detected.
Figure 5 may illustrate the process.
Table 1 summarises the results obtained when ap-
plying the described fault detection method to the new
data set, i.e., a gradual change of parameters. The re-
sulting alarm vectors using two different threshold
values, m = 5 and m = 2, in conjunction with a filter
depth of 5, are shown.
The change in the parameters starts at time instant
t = 2500, and lasts 10 seconds. The alarm vectors in the
table below show that within the next 18 seconds, the
malfunction is not detected when using a threshold in
the alarm module of m = 5, and some abnormal situation
Figure 5.  Fault detection scheme
is reported for time span [2505, 2515] when using
m = 2. The latter would have been interpreted by the
fault monitoring system as a false alarm, because from
t = 2516 onward, the alarm vector is switched off again.
Moreover, using low threshold values implies a higher
probability of false alarms. It is interesting to detect
faults as early as possible, but only real faults should
be reported.
As presented in the next section, this problem can
be tackled using the so-called “envelopes.”
5. Detection with Envelopes
The concept of “envelopes,” in the context of the FIR
methodology, is introduced in this section and will be
used to detect structural changes in an aircraft model.
To understand how these envelopes can be obtained,
the qualitative simulation engine of the FIR methodol-
ogy needs to be explained here.
The Qualitative Simulation Engine. Given an FIR
qualitative model, described by means of a mask and
three behaviour matrices (constituting a set of fuzzy
rules) for every output variable to be modelled, the
goal of the Qualitative Simulation Engine (QSE) is to
forecast a value for each of the chosen output variables.
The procedure is as follows. At each sampling in-
stant, the mask is shifted one step forward along the
class matrix of the fuzzified values of the (quantitative)
variables. Classes of the m-inputs are read out from the
mask, and a so-called input state vector is constructed.
Then the class behaviour matrix is searched for coinci-
dences on that input state vector, and the associated
membership and side functions of each record found
are compared with the ones of the input state vector.
The five nearest neighbours are identified and used to
compute the class, membership, and side values of
the output. Figure 6 may give a clearer insight of this
process using the five-variable example presented in
Section 2. Each output is determined as an averaged
value from the outputs associated with the five nearest
neighbours, where the weights are determined based
on the relative relevance (proximity or similarity) of
each of the five nearest training data to the testing data
record in the m-input space [20].
When using an FIR qualitative model to predict a
system, a measure of the model error can be obtained
comparing the forecast value with the real (fuzzified)
value of the concerned variable. Using the B4 aircraft
qualitative model presented in Section 3, new values
of the outputs can be forecast and compared with the
B4 validation data set (values of the variable trajecto-
ries not used in the FIR modelling process). If the mean
square error is used, mse = 0.1702 is the obtained value
for the forecasting average error of the FIR qualitative
model. Although there is a separate forecasting aver-
age error for every output variable, in this study, the
Figure 6.  Fuzzy forecasting process
Time Alarm vector, m=5 Alarm vector, m=2
2500 0 0
2501 0 0
2502 0 0
2503 0 0
2504 0 0
2505 0 1
2506 0 1
2507 0 1
2508 0 1
2509 0 1
2510 0 1
2511 0 1
2512 0 1
2513 0 1
2514 0 1
2515 0 1
2516 0 0
2517 0 0
2518 0 0
Table 1.  Alarm vectors using the detection
approach proposed in [6, 9] with smooth change
largest of these mse values has been used to character-
ise the envelopes of all three of the output variables.
Envelopes. The idea behind the envelopes approach
is to compute, for each forecast value, an interval of
acceptability of the real trajectory value. Up to now, a
single (defuzzified) prediction was made at each point
in time, which had been computed as an average of
the output values of the five nearest neighbours in the
training data base. Yet, it is perfectly defendable to
make predictions in different ways. For example, it
may make sense to consider the range of predictions
made by the five nearest neighbours as an envelope of
acceptable predictions. The closer the five nearest
neighbours are to each other, i.e., the smaller the dis-
persion among them, the more narrow that envelope
will be. On the other hand, the larger the dispersion
among the five nearest neighbours, the wider the en-
velope will become. Let α and β be the minimum and
maximum predictions made by any of the five neigh-
bours, the envelope will then be defined by the range
[α, β], a time-varying interval of forecasting acceptability
associated with the predicted output variable. This
information can be exploited for fault monitoring. The
SAPS forecasting engine now returns three separate
values at each time step: the predicted value of the
output (a weighted average), the smallest acceptable
prediction, α, and the largest acceptable prediction, β.
Notice that the width of the interval [α, β] provides
information about how good the qualitative model is
in terms of the dispersion among the five nearest neigh-
bours (small values indicate that the five neighbours
are close to each other, whereas a large interval denotes
that the neighbours are sparse and that the prediction
may possibly be inaccurate). It also provides an indica-
tion about whether the training data set size has been
large enough.
Yet there is a second source of inaccuracy to be con-
sidered, namely the inaccuracy stemming from the re-
duced information contained in the selected mask. This
inaccuracy can be estimated through the mse value men-
tioned earlier in this section. The mse value denotes the
average inaccuracy of the weighted mean of the five
nearest neighbours. To account for this second source
of inaccuracy, the interval of forecasting acceptability
is widened to the range [α(1 – mse * P/100), β(1 + mse
* P/100)], where P is the predicted value of the output
variable and mse is the forecasting average error of the
qualitative model. This range is called the interval of
variable acceptability.
Denoting:
A = α(1 – mse * P/100)
B = β(1 + mse * P/100),
The interval [A,B] of variable acceptability is the one
within which the forecast and the real values of the
output trajectory will be considered to match. Succes-
sive values of A and B along the time axis constitute
the variable acceptability envelope (in short: envelope).
Whenever the real value leaves the variable acceptabil-
ity envelope, an instantaneous error of the concerned
output variable is flagged.
Two experiments have been carried out using this
new approach. First, the envelopes have been used to
monitor a sudden change in the aircraft parameters,
as proposed in [6] and [9], and subsequently, they were
employed to monitor a smooth change in the aircraft
parameters as explained in Section 4.
5.1 Sudden Change Detection
The method of the acceptability envelope of the vari-
ables has been applied to the case of an instantaneous
change in the aeroplane parameters. Figure 8 shows
the trajectory of the real output variable D together
with the interval of acceptable forecast values (the so-
called envelope) obtained by the qualitative FIR model
of the B4 aircraft. The figure covers a much shorter
time interval than that provided in Figures 3 and 4,Figure 7.  Interval of variable acceptability
Figure 8.  Variable D: real system values
and forecast acceptability envelope
because the envelope is narrow, indicating that the
found qualitative model is of high quality. A wider
time window would have made the figure less easily
interpretable.
In order to perform fault detection using the enve-
lopes, the method explained in Section 4 is used. An
instantaneous error matrix is constructed, where every
column is associated with an output variable, and
every row corresponds to a sampling instant. A zero
value denotes no error (i.e., the value of the real system
variable lies within the interval of variable acceptabil-
ity), and a value of one means an instantaneous predic-
tion error has been registered (i.e., the quantitative real
value is outside the range of variable acceptability).
Then the error matrix is filtered using a moving aver-
age filter, and when the output passes the specified
error threshold, an alarm is triggered. Table 2 summar-
ises the results obtained with this method when ap-
plied to the situation of a sudden change in aircraft
parameter values.
The fault alarm vector has been obtained using a
threshold of m = 5 and an error window of depth 5.
Notice that the accident is detected at time instant
2503, only three seconds after it took place, and the
fault remains flagged ever after. The new method of
the envelopes is hence reported to detect the malfunc-
tion at an earlier time than the approach proposed in
[6] and [9]. Moreover, the obtained alarm vector is
more stable in the sense that it does not return to a zero
value after the transient has taken place, thereby
Time Alarm
2500 0
2501 0
2502 0
2503 1
2504 1
2505 1
2506 1
2507 1
2508 1
2509 1
2510 1
2511 1
2512 1
2513 1
2514 1
2515 1
2516 1
2517 1
2518 1
Table 2. Alarm vector obtained when performing
fault detection with the envelopes approach in a
sudden parameter change situation.
Figure 9.  Envelopes with smooth change in variable L
Figure 11.  Envelopes with smooth change in variable GA
Figure 10.  Envelopes with smooth change in variable D
decreasing the probability of a true emergency being
mistaken for a false alarm.
5.2 Smooth Change Detection
In this simulation, a smooth parameter change is ap-
plied as explained in Section 4, but now, the envelopes
approach is applied to fault detection. Figures 9 to 11
show the trajectories of the three output variables to-
gether with the forecast envelopes obtained for the
qualitative B4 model.
Table 3 summarises the results that have been ob-
tained using the method of the envelopes when using
two different alarm thresholds: m = 5 and m = 2 and
an error window of depth 5.
In order to make it easy to compare the results with
those obtained using fuzzy inductive reasoning toge-
ther with crisp fault detection, as presented in [9], the
two left-most columns of Table 3 show the results ob-
tained with the method of envelopes, whereas the two
right-most columns reproduce the results discussed in
Section 4.1.
Using m = 5, the smooth fault is detected four sec-
onds after initiating the change of the B4 parameters.
If m = 2 is applied, an earlier detection is achieved
(three seconds instead of four), and conversely to the
results obtained in Section 4.1, the fault alarm remains
flagged after time instant 2515.
6. Conclusions
When a malfunction occurs in a system, it is desirable
to detect the malfunction as early as possible, but also
in a reliable and robust manner, minimising the num-
ber of false alarms that are being interpreted as true
emergencies, but also minimising the number of true
emergencies that are being interpreted as false alarms.
This paper concentrates on both aspects of fault moni-
toring, using a Boeing 747 aircraft model as a bench-
mark.
Two Fuzzy Inductive Reasoning-based approaches
are compared. Both of them use FIR as a qualitative
modelling technique, but the former uses a crisp fault
detection approach, whereas the latter makes use of a
newly proposed envelope detection method. Crisp
fault detection had successfully been used in previous
research efforts [6, 9] to detect sudden changes in sys-
tem parameters, such as an engine falling off the air-
craft, but is not well suited when confronted with
smooth parameter changes that lead to a slow deterio-
ration of the plant, such as ice building up on the
wings of the aircraft.
The concepts of interval of forecast acceptability and
interval of variable acceptability are introduced, and a
fault monitoring method based on these intervals has
been presented. In the case of a sudden change of the
aircraft parameters, this new method detects the fault
earlier. When the parameters of the aircraft are varied
smoothly, the malfunction is detected using error
threshold values that do not permit a fault detection
using the crisp detection method. Moreover, the detec-
tion is more robust, since for a given threshold, the
existing fault remains flagged, whereas using the
crisp method the alarm disappears again, making it
likely that the true emergency would be interpreted
by the flight engineer as a false alarm.
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